Negative results are needed to show the specific value of a cultural explanation for g: A commentary on Burkart et al.
general intelligence ability should exhibit a psychometric g, finding a psychometric g does not imply that variation in a core ability causes it. If g were caused by a core ability, then training this ability should show transfer effects to distal cognitive abilities. The authors cite such training studies, but acknowledge controversy about bias and methods (see also Colom et al., 2013; Redick, 2015) . Noack, Lövdén, and Schmiedek (2014) conclude the existing literature cannot establish such latent transfer effects. Claims of bilingual advantage have been similarly contested (Paap, Johnson, & Sawi, 2015) . If training of purported core abilities such as executive functions does not increase latent g, the case for core abilities causing the positive manifold weakens considerably. Moreover, positive correlations have not only been found among cognitive abilities but also between cognitive abilities and other fitness-related traits such as health, psychopathology and height (Arden et al., 2016) . Hagenaars et al. (2016) showed molecular evidence that a shared genetic aetiology underlies the phenotypic associations between health and intelligence.
Reasonable, less cognition-specific explanations have been put forward to explain such positive manifolds. First among them is probably genetic load (Hill et al., in press; Penke et al., 2007) . Individuals vary in the number of deleterious genetic mutations they carry. Depending on where they occur, such wrong turns on the genotype-phenotype map could affect the integrity and condition of the whole organism, its brain, or more specific abilities. If many of the variants affecting cognitive abilities are pleiotropic (be that because they affect early development steps or because they disrupt frequently re-used genetic patterns), then we would also expect positive correlations between cognitive abilities and other fitness-related individual differences (Deary, 2012; Houle, 2000) . Although causal inference from genetic correlations is hard (Johnson, Penke, & Spinath, 2011; Solovieff, Cotsapas, Lee, Purcell, & Smoller, 2013) , we ought to consider the possibility that biological pleiotropy, not just health behavior, explains associations between intelligence and health. For example, evolutionarily conserved genomic regions are strongly enriched for genetic variants affecting intelligence (Hill et al., in press ). We think this can explain some of the g phenomenon. An explanation based on genetic load can even explain correlations between abilities resulting from primary modules. Other sources of individual differences such as stochastic events in early development can take an explanatory role similar to genetic load, by affecting early developmental steps and pervasive building blocks of the organism (Deary, 2012) .
Hence, our null hypothesis should not be complete independence of cognitive abilities, even if we knew they were primary modules. Some intercorrelation should be expected. The expected degree of intercorrelation depends on many unknowns, among them the degree of pleiotropy, the mutational target size, metabolic costs and ontogeny of cognitive abilities.
With the non-human data available so far, we see a gap in the authors' case: the absence of clear negative results in the search for g/G. The authors report no taxon where the search for the g factor was conducted with sufficient power and appropriate methods but still failed. We suggest that only after also gathering data from less social species can we ask whether e.g. social learning increases correlations between cognitive abilities. And only when correlations with non-cognitive abilities are compared can we ask what explains the increased correlation between cognitive abilities. As the authors point out, non-human research can help test explanations for g with designs infeasible in humans, such as cross-fostering experiments. This extends to genetic load. Both using genetically uniform strains and mutation accumulation lines (although these are already extremely timeconsuming in micro-organisms) could help clarify the involvement of genetic load.
We lack the space to fully address alternative explanations for interspecies G, but hope to also see joint phylogenetic tree analyses of sociality and variance explained by g. To be able to test this, recommendations for increased sample sizes in such studies should be followed (Thornton & Lukas, 2012) . Differential measurement error across subtests and species has to be modelled and corrected for, not just used to explain negative findings.
In conclusion, we would add the following to the authors' call for research: we need individual differences data along the whole gradient of sociality, including even e.g. octopuses, and studies should also examine more distal traits such as health and size. Then, the specific added value of the proposed model can be tested. We want to echo this and previous calls (Arden et al., 2016; Thornton & Lukas, 2012) for more individual differences research on non-human animal cognition. We hope for more stimulating evolutionary theorizing on individual differences, as in this target article.
